Penser la guerre, c'est se placer dans l'effort philosophique qui se conçoit comme élucidation et affirmation rationnelles des différentes manières dont l'option humaine pour la raison et contre la violence se réalise dans l'histoire. Cette thèse fournit le point de vue à partir duquel l'auteur épouse la pensée de Kant, von Clausewitz et Hegel, en essayant ensuite d'en tirer des leçons possibles en vue des discussions actuelles dans la philosophie politique en tant que réflexion sur la guerre et la paix. (...) Von Clausewitz, penseur de la guerre après la « révolution » militaire depuis Napoléon, n'est pas seulement le « militariste » s'appliquant à la rationalité qui se déploie dans la violence guerrière elle-même, mais a surtout montré comment la guerre doit emprunter sa rationalité spécifique à la rationalité supérieure et englobante qui est celle de la politique , selon sa célèbre formule: la guerre est la continuation de la politique avec d'autres moyens. Mais il s'agit de bien comprenre cette formule. Dans la philosophie politique hégélienne, qui veut «saisir en pensée» le système d'une pluralité d'États indépendants et également souverains, la guerre a le caractère d'une «nécessité» rationnelle. Dans la philosophie du droit de Kant, la paix stable est l'objet d'un devoir impératif de la pure raison pratique, mais la guerre semble, de fait, inévitable, et ceci encore pour longtemps. C'est dans son projet philosophique intitulé Vers la paix perpétuelle que Kant essaie de penser les conditions politiques nécessaires pour établir une paix durable et juste entre les nations. L'auteur montre que ce projet est moins irréaliste qu'on ne le pense le plus souvent, si on veut l'interpréter à la lumière de la philosophie de l'histoire de Kant. On peut se demander néanmoins si Hegel ne continue pas à avoir raison contre Kant. Mais pour Hegel aussi l'histoire est un apprentissage. Au philosophe qui la comprend elle prouve, dit-il, la perfectibilité de l'éducation du genre humain. Il est possible de trouver, de ce point de vue, une convergence de la philosophie de l'histoire de Hegel avec celle de Kant. Une importance spécifique est donnée ici à l'interprétation du dictum de Hegel, que dans la guerre elle-même la guerre est déterminée comme devant être passagère . S'il est vrai que l'histoire de la dialectique de guerre et de paix peut nous rendre plus „sages”, qu'est-ce qu'elle nous a appris ? L'auteur souligne plus spécialement deux éléments: nous comprenons peut-être mieux la signification de la liberté et de ce qu'implique „libération”; nous voyons plus clairement l'importance à donner aux droits de l'homme comme expression de la justice. Il conclut que la philosophie comme „pensée de guerre” peut éclairer la politique dans son effort tendant à définir la justice qui peut établir la paix, afin de rendre superflue la guerre qui doit établir la justice. (shrink)

Criteria of identity should mirror the identity relation in being reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive. However, this logical requirement is only rarely met by the criteria that we are most inclined to propose as candidates. The present paper addresses the question how such obvious candidates are best approximated by means of relations that have all of the aforementioned features, i.e., which are equivalence relations. This question divides into two more basic questions. First, what is to be considered a ‘best’ approximation. And (...) second, how can these best approximations be found? In answering these questions, we both rely on and constructively criticize ground-breaking work done by Timothy Williamson. Guiding ideas of our approach are that we allow approximations by means of overlapping equivalence-relations, and that closeness of approximation is measured in terms of the number of mistakes made by the approximation when compared to the obvious candidate criterion. (shrink)

The traditional conception of response-dependence isinadequate because it cannot account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence. In particular, it is unableto account for the response-dependence of (aesthetic, moral, epistemic ...) values. I therefore propose tosupplement the traditional conception with an alternativeone. My claim is that only a combination of the twoconceptions is able to account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence.

The paper argues that an important class of aesthetic terms cannot be used as metaphors because it is impossible to commit a category mistake with them. It then uses this fact to provide a general definition of 'aesthetic property'.

This article examines the relationship between women entrepreneurs’ job autonomy and work–life balance, with a particular focus on how this relationship might be augmented by environments that discriminate against women, whether socio-economically, institutionally, or culturally. Multisource data pertaining to 5334 women entrepreneurs from 37 countries indicate that their sense of job autonomy increases the likelihood that they feel satisfied with their ability to balance the needs of their work with those of their personal life. This process is particularly prominent when (...) they operate in countries characterized by discriminatory socio-economic and institutional conditions, though a mitigating instead of invigorating effect arises in culturally discriminatory settings. For business ethics scholars and practitioners, these findings indicate how the extent to which women entrepreneurs, seeking to combine professional and private responsibilities, derive benefits from initiatives aimed at enhancing their job-related freedom critically depends on whether they operate in adverse external environments. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that recent attempts at explaining aesthetic ineffability have been unsuccessful. Either they misrepresent what aesthetic ineffability consists in, or they leave important aspects of it unexplained. I then show how a more satisfying account might be developed, once a distinction is made between two kinds of awareness. -/- .

This is a critical discussion of Nick Zangwill’s Aesthetic Creation Theory of Art, as presented in his book Aesthetic Creation. The discussion focuses on two questions: first, whether the notion of art implied by Zangwill’s theory is at once too wide and too narrow; second, whether Zangwill is right about the persistence conditions of works of art.

Overzicht van de ideeën omtrent politieke macht in verleden en heden.

This chapter offers a new solution to the paradox of negative emotion in art. Crucial to the defense of this new solution is the normative sense of predicates such as 'is moving', 'is touching', 'is powerful', and 'is gripping'. Roughly, the solution itself is that, in their normative sense, these predicates designate aesthetic properties that we enjoy and value experiencing, even tough, in the cases which generate the paradox, the enjoyment comes at a price.

Presentism is the view that only present entities exist. Recently, several authors have asked the question whether presentism is able to account for cross-time relations, i.e., roughly, relations between entities existing at different times. In this paper I claim that this question is to be answered in the affirmative. To make this claim plausible, I consider four types of cross-time relation and show how each can be accommodated without difficulty within the metaphysical framework of presentism.

The aim of this paper is to achieve a better understanding of why modern buildings do not easily harmonize with one another. After proposing, and defending, an analysis of the concept of architectural harmony, the paper turns to three possible views on whether we can expect more harmony from modern architecture in the future.

(1988). Science at court: the eighteenth-century cabinet of scientific instruments and models of the Dutch stadholders. Annals of Science: Vol. 45, No. 2, pp. 113-152.

The debate about cinematic motion revolves around the question of whether the movement of cinematic images is real. That the movement we perceive in film should be construed as the movement of images is taken for granted. But this is a mistake. There is no reason to suppose that cinematic images of moving objects are themselves perceived to be moving. All that is necessary is to perceive these images as continuously changing images of one and the same object.

This article deals with the problems of abortion as a political issue, in the form represented in the two reports of the Belgian «National Commission for Ethical Problems». Both the «translation» of the political problem into a question to be handled by an «apolitical» commission on the level of scientific expertness, and the delivery of two mutually dissenting reports, are studied as a typical stage of the development of the political decision-making process in this matter and compared with similar evolutions (...) in the neighbour countries. From a view point of political theory the main problem is the following : how a parliamentary democracy solves such a deap-seated confiict concerning the «basic values» of ethical order of society? Elements of an answer can be gathered from a comparative analysis of the different positions and arguments in the two reports of the Ethical Commission. (shrink)

If possible worlds are conjunctions of states of affairs, as in David Armstrong’s combinatorial theory, then is the empty world to be thought of as the null conjunction of states of affairs? The proposal seems plausible, and has received support from David Efird, Tom Stoneham, and Armstrong himself. However, in this paper, it is argued that the proposal faces a trilemma: either it leads to the absurd conclusion that the actual world is empty; or it reduces to a familiar representation (...) of the empty world in which the concept of a null conjunction plays no role; or it needs to make room for the null individual of certain non-classical mereologies. (shrink)

Art restorations often give rise to controversy, and the reason does not always seem to be a lack of skill or dedication on the side of the restorer. Rather, in some of the most famous cases, the reason seems to be a lack of agreement on basic principles. In particular, there seems to be a lack of agreement on how the following two questions are to be answered. First, what is art restoration supposed to achieve, in other words, what is (...) the goal of restoration? Second, how can this goal be achieved, in other words, what are the means that a restorer can legitimately make use of? In this paper, I formulate, and defend, a principle that answers these questions. Although the principle may sound platitudinous, it has been contradicted by prominent philosophers and by important organizations concerned with conservation. Moreover, defending the principle turns out to be impossible without touching on such vexed philosophical issues as the ontology and identity of artworks, as well as the nature of perceptual and aesthetic properties (including the nature of artistic value). (shrink)

This chapter surveys the ethical and metaphysical issues raised by the restoration of paintings and sculptures.

According to Locke’s Principle, material objects are identical if and only if they are of the same kind and once occupy the same place at the same time. There is disagreement about whether this principle is true, but what is seldom disputed is that, even if true, the principle fails to constitute an applicable criterion of identity. In this paper, I take issue with two arguments that have been offered in support of this claim by arguing (i) that we can (...) have knowledge of past whereabouts, and so verify the right hand side of Locke’s Principle, without having to assess concrete identity claims first; (ii) that even under conditions of incomplete knowledge of past whereabouts we can use Locke’s Principle to decide concrete identity problems. (shrink)

In this paper I present two new strategies for inconsistencyadaptive logics: the reliable sufficient information strategy of ACLuN3 andthe minimally abnormal sufficient information strategy of ACLuN4. I giveproof theory and semantics for both ACLuN3 and ACLuN4. I also compare them with the well-known inconsistency-adaptive logics ACLuN1 andACLuN2.

«Without a theory of corruption there cannot be a remedy for corruption unless by happy accident». There are empirical theories, such as the functional approach of the political process, but how useful they may be, they essentially fall short. One needs a normative, i.e. an ethical theory of political action.After having evaluated the idea, that politicians and rulers have the right to make use of violence, lies and ruses in order to combat violence and ruse within the community, the article (...) draws some important conclusions from the general democratic principle «no power without control and possibility of sanction by those being subject to that power».Applied to the problem of corruption, this principle can be used as a guideline for a systematic exploration of the structural sources of corruption, defined in a general way as abuse of power. The main thesis reads as follows. The sources of corruption are to be found in those «deficiencies of the system» that create chances for a particular pressure of power to exert an overweight - without possibilities of control and sanction - in the processes of actual definition of the «public interest» or the «common good».An elaboration of the thesis is made by means of an analysis of this kind of «deficiencies» in the Belgian political-administrative system, most of them however not specific for the Belgian situation in particular.Finally, some suggestions for «remedies » against corruption are made, especially in the field of legislative measures. (shrink)

In his article, Bester (2018) criticizes the so-called “harm consensus” movement among a growing number of bioethicists and practitioners. He argues that the harm principle is unable to replace the...

In recent issues of this journal, Roger Scruton and Malcolm Budd have debated the question whether hearing a melody in a sequence of sounds necessarily involves an ‘unasserted thought’ about spatial movement. According to Scruton, the answer is ‘yes’; according to Budd, the answer is ‘no’. The conclusion of this paper is that, while Budd may have underestimated the viability of Scruton's thesis in one of its possible interpretations, there is no good reason to assume that the thesis is true. (...) Very briefly, the argument for the second part of the conclusion is that we can account for all the data adduced by Scruton in favour of his hypothesis by means of hypotheses that are far less daring. (shrink)

Key legislations in many countries emphasize the importance of involving children in decisions regarding their own health at a level commensurate with their age and capacities. Research is engaged in developing tools to assess capacity in children in order to facilitate their responsible involvement. These instruments, however, are usually based on the cognitive criteria for capacity assessment as defined by Appelbaum and Grisso and thus ill adapted to address the life-situation of children. The aim of this paper is to revisit (...) and critically reflect upon the current definitions of decision-making capacity. For this purpose, we propose to see capacity through the lens of essential contestability as it warns us against any reification of what it means to have capacity. Currently, capacity is often perceived of as a mental or cognitive ability which somehow resides within the person, obscuring the fact that capacity is not just an objective property which can be assessed, but always operates within a dominant cultural framework that “creates” that same capacity and defines the threshold between capable and incapable in a specific situation. Defining capacity as an essentially contested concept means using it in a questioning mode and giving space to alternative interpretations that might inform and advance the debate surrounding decision-making. (shrink)

Aesthetic properties are often thought to have either no evaluative component or an evaluative component that can be isolated from their descriptive component. The present article argues that this popular view is without adequate support. First, doubt is cast on the idea that some paradigmatic aesthetic properties are purely descriptive. Second, the idea that the evaluative component of an aesthetic property can always be neatly separated from its descriptive component is called into question. Meanwhile, a speculative hypothesis is launched regarding (...) the structure of being garish and being cacophonous. Finally, an explanation is given of how the issue of the structure of aesthetic properties bears on their reality and (presumed) response-dependence. (shrink)

This study provides insight into the experiences of young adults born with variations of sex characteristics to identify aspects of care and social support that need improvement. Semi-structured interviews with intersex youths in Switzerland were analyzed using interpretative, phenomenological analysis. Young adults desire timely, patient-centered information about their diagnoses. Peer support is key to delivering high-quality care but rarely systematically implemented. Intersex youth often face misrepresentation, stigma, and discrimination in medical settings and in society. Increased visibility alone cannot tackle these (...) issues, but a feminist curiosity of care will enable health providers and society to overcome preconceptions of body normativity. (shrink)

Recently, several authors have claimed to have found graph-theoretic counterexamples to the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. In this paper, I argue that their counterexamples presuppose a certain view of what unlabeled graphs are, and that this view is optional at best.

The goal of our paper is to provide a description of an apparent V3 pattern which is salient with some speakers of the Ghent dialect, illustrated in (1), from Vanacker ( 1980 ). Vroeger, die bakten wij vier soorten brood formerly die baked we four sorts bread “We used to bake four kinds of bread.” (Gijzenzele 0.28) (Vanacker, 1980, p. 76) In such examples, what would be an initial adverbial constituent in the root clause vroeger, (“formerly”) is separated from the (...) finite verb by what Vanacker ( 1980 ) labels a “pleonastic” element, die, in effect leading to a superficial V3 order. At first sight, this element die is optional and it has no impact on the truth conditions of the proposition that it introduces. (2) is also acceptable in the dialect. (2) Vroeger bakten wij vier soorten brood. formerly baked we four sorts bread “We used to bake four kinds of bread.” In the first part of the paper, we will provide a description of the distribution of die. We will also compare its distribution with that of the more widely distributed resumptive adverbs dan (“then”) and daar (“there”), which are typical of the Germanic V2 languages (Salvesen, 2016 ). Our account will be based both on authentic data drawn from corpora and from anecdotal observations as well as on the results of elicitations with 10 native speakers of the dialect. In the second part of the paper we provide an analysis in terms of Wolfe's ( 2016 ) typology of the syntax of V2. Adopting the articulated structure of CP as elaborated in the cartographic framework, we will propose that die is an overt spell out of the head Force and as such a root complementiser. (shrink)

The involvement of children in non-beneficial clinical research is extremely important for improving pediatric care, but its ethical acceptability is still disputed. Therefore, various pro-research justifications have been proposed throughout the years. The present essay aims at contributing to the on-going discussion surrounding children’s participation in non-beneficial clinical research. Building on Wendler’s ‘contribution to a valuable project’ justification, but going beyond a risk/benefit analysis, it articulates a pro-research argument which appeals to a phenomenological view on the body and vulnerability. It (...) is claimed that children’s bodies are not mere physical objects, but body-subjects due to which children, as persons, can contribute to research that may hold no direct clinical benefit to them even before they can give informed consent. (shrink)

For centuries, it has been recognized that beauty can move. My aim in this paper is to understand how beauty moves. One suggestion is that beauty moves in a causal way, for example, by causing us to have certain feelings. Four objections to this suggestion are considered, but none is found convincing in the light of how causation tends to be understood. Moreover, it turns out that there is positive reason for thinking that beauty is causally efficacious, not just once (...) it has been experienced, as John Hyman has suggested, but even in bringing about the experience on which all other effects of beauty depend. (shrink)

This article is a reply to Dominic McIver Lopes, 'Shikinen Sengu and the Ontology of Architecture in Japan,' published in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 65 (2007). The reply explains how the standard ontology of architecture is able to accommodate Japanese shrines such as Ise Jingu.

One of the oldest platitudes about beauty is that it is pleasant to perceive or experience. In this article, I take this platitude at face value and try to explain why experiences of beauty are seemingly always accompanied by pleasure. Unlike explanations that have been offered in the past, the explanation proposed is designed to suit a “realist” view on which beauty is an irreducibly evaluative property, that is, a value. In a nutshell, the explanation is that experiences of beauty (...) are experiences in which it appears that something is beautiful, and that such experiences are identical to experiences of aesthetic pleasure. (shrink)

A series of unnoticeably small changes in an observable property may add up to a noticeable change. Crispin Wright has used this fact to prove that perceptual indiscriminability is a non-transitive relation. Delia Graff has recently argued that there is a 'tension' between Wright's assumptions. But Graff has misunderstood one of these, that 'phenomenal continua' are possible; and the other, that our powers of discrimination are finite, is sound. If the first assumption is properly understood, it is not in tension (...) with but is actually implied by the second, given a plausible physical assumption. (shrink)

In The Aesthetics of Architecture, Roger Scruton makes at least four claims about rightness of architectural proportion. The present paper lists those claims, briefly discusses the way they are related, and, finally, selects one as the topic of discussion: the claim that there cannot be an exact, mathematical definition of rightness of proportion. Scruton’s arguments for this claim are reviewed. The first is found to be substantially correct, whereas the second is found to rely on a mistaken assumption, namely the (...) assumption that rightness of proportion is relative to a point of view. The paper ends by arguing that either the real or the apparent proportions of a building have to be definitely right, and that neither can be allowed to be definitely wrong. (shrink)

The aim of this chapter is to understand how sortals determine what aesthetic properties an object has. It is argued that Frank Sibley’s notion of an ideal of beauty does not help us to achieve that aim. Instead, it is argued, the special aesthetic relevance of sortals is better understood by reference to the (non-aesthetic) ideas of normality and functionality associated with sortals. In passing, the paper also argues that there must be a maximum degree of beauty if non-comparative judgments (...) of beauty are possible, as they seem to be. (shrink)

This essay argues for two conclusions about functional beauty, as this notion has been understood by Parsons and Carlson in a recent book by the same name. First of all, it is argued that functional beauty either is not a distinct kind of beauty or that the members of this kind are not all and only instances of the property of looking fit. Second, it is argued that functional beauty is relative only to categories corresponding to essential functions. The second (...) conclusion contradicts what Parsons and Carlson write about functional beauty, but the first conclusion does not, since they agree that looking fit is not necessary for functional beauty. However, their agreement on this point is based on reasons that can be shown to be mistaken. Moreover, contrary to what Parsons and Carlson claim, looking fit can also be shown to be insufficient for functional beauty. (shrink)

Echoing a distinction made by David Wiggins in his discussion of the relation of identity, this paper investigates whether aesthetic adjectives such as ‘beautiful’ are sortal-relative or merely sortal-dependent. The hypothesis guiding the paper is that aesthetic adjectives, though probably sortal-dependent in general, are sortal-relative only when used to characterize multifunctional artefacts. This means that multifunctional artefacts should be unique in allowing the following situation to occur: for some object x there are sortals K and K' such that x is (...) a beautiful K and also a K', but not a beautiful K'. Examples of multifunctional artefacts show that this is indeed a possibility. However, that multifunctional artefacts are unique in this respect will be demonstrated by a more principled argument, taking into account the nature of functions on the one hand, and the nature of artefact-classification on the other hand. (shrink)

Libertarian philosopher Michael Huemer has argued recently that there is a prima facie right to immigrate, and, moreover, that concerns people have about the effects of immigration are not strong enough to neutralize or override this prima facie right. In this paper, I focus on one particular concern that Huemer deems insufficiently strong to neutralize or override the prima facie right to immigrate, namely, the concern that unrestricted immigration poses a threat to one’s culture. I argue that Huemer fails to (...) show that the concern is insufficiently strong. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that our ontology of art has undergone a major change in the course of modern history. While we currently think of artworks as parts arranged in a certain way, there was a time when artworks were thought of as metaphysically more akin to ordinary artefacts such as tables and chairs; that is, as wholes having replaceable parts. This change in our ontology of art is reflected in our approach to art restoration. But what explains the (...) change? I will suggest that the change took place because of a change in our conception of the function of art. More specifically, I will suggest that we have started to think of artworks as parts arranged in a certain way, because we have started to think of artworks as having, primarily, an aesthetic function. (shrink)

This article aims to make a case for the need to sensitize the medical community on the importance of providing sexual health information in the care of intersex adolescents and young adults for whom sexuality and intimacy are sensitive subjects—and to go beyond a narrow focus on surgical outcomes. For this purpose, this article gives voice to the lived experience of “Emma,” a young adult who identifies as intersex. Setting up strong collaboration between medical teams and intersex support groups might (...) be the best way forward to provide high-quality care to youth born with variations of sex characteristics. (shrink)

This paper continues Israel Scheffler's investigation of rituals as autographic/allographic. It concludes that the autographic/allographic distinction is more fruitfully applied to rituals as a gradual distinction, distinguishing rituals in terms of their autographic/allographic elements or aspects.

This study adds to business ethics research by examining how employees’ religiosity might enhance their propensity to engage in change-oriented citizenship behavior, as well as how this effect may be invigorated in adverse organizational climates with respect to voluntarism. Two-wave survey data collected from employees in Pakistan show that change-oriented citizenship activities increase to the extent that employees can draw on their personal resource of religiosity and perceive little adversity, measured in this study with respect to whether voluntarism is encouraged. (...) Further, the relative usefulness of religiosity for spurring change-oriented citizenship behavior is particularly strong when employees experience high levels of this organizational adversity, because employees with high religiosity tend to believe that such behavior is more needed in these organizational contexts. For organizations, these results demonstrate that the energy derived from religiosity may stimulate voluntary efforts that invoke organizational change, and the perceived value of such energy allocation is greater when employees perceive organizational environments that provide little encouragement to go beyond formal job duties. (shrink)

This survey chapter discusses four issues in architectural aesthetics: architectural design, architectural style, the justification of “optical correction”, and the metaphysics of reconstruction.

In this paper, we take another look at the reasons for which the causal criterion of event identity has been abandoned. We argue that the reasons are not strong. First of all, there is a criterion in the neighborhood of the causal criterion—the counterfactual criterion—that is not vulnerable to any of the putative counterexamples brought up in the literature. Secondly, neither the causal criterion nor the counterfactual criterion suffers from any form of vicious circularity. Nonetheless, we do not recommend adopting (...) either the causal or the counterfactual criterion because, given a sufficiently lax principle of event composition, neither criterion can be applied to complex events. This we regard as a (prima facie) undesirable restriction on their applicability. (shrink)